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Islamic State online propaganda referral action (November 2019)

November 2019, Terrorism and extremism
Led by Federal Public Prosecutor's Office of Belgium

Excluded after reverification. Verified August 23, 2026.

What was taken down?

More than 26,000 items of Islamic State-supporting content were referred to nine online service providers for terms-of-service evaluation/removal; the located official source does not establish a government seizure or takeover of infrastructure.[1]

See what happened

What happened to the people?

Officials reported 1 apprehended.
Group accounted for: Not applicable

See people and accountability

Did it stay down?

After this action the service returned on replacement infrastructure. No later seizure of the replacement is recorded. Medium confidence in the link between the two.

See what happened afterward

A referral action coordinated by Europol's EU Internet Referral Unit with Eurojust support, joined by 12 Member States and 9 online service providers, referred over 26,000 items of Islamic State propaganda for terms-of-service review; the Guardia Civil arrested one suspected core disseminator in Spain. The operation was led by the Belgian Investigating Counter Terrorism Judge and the Belgian Federal Prosecutor's Office with the Belgian Federal Judicial Police of East-Flanders, following the April 2018 Belgian-led takedown of IS web infrastructure.[1]

Announced November 25, 2019.

Date
November 21 to November 24, 2019
Target
Islamic State web/media infrastructure, terrorist propaganda infrastructure
Activity
Terrorism and extremism
Operational lead
Belgian Federal Prosecutor
Partners
Europol[1]
Jurisdiction
Not established
Outcome
More than 26,000 items of Islamic State-supporting content were referred to nine online service providers for terms-of-service evaluation/removal; the located official source does not establish a government seizure or takeover of infrastructure.
Status
Completed
Legal mechanism
Europol EU Internet Referral Unit referral to online service providers for terms-of-service assessment, under Belgian judicial direction; one arrest in Spain under the Central Magistrate's Investigating Courts and the Prosecutor's Office of the Audiencia Nacional.
Group accounted for
Not applicable

No individual is named against this entry in the cited record. That is a gap in what has been published rather than a finding that nobody was involved.

Group accounted for: Not applicable

The cited record does not say how large the group was or whether everyone involved has been identified.

See the organizations and roles behind this action

After this action the service returned on replacement infrastructure. No later seizure of the replacement is recorded. Medium confidence in the link between the two.[1]

  1. Date not established

    Islamic State propaganda migration to TamTam and Hoop Messenger. Same service on replacement infrastructure. Confidence: Medium. No later seizure recorded.[2]

    After the November 2019 Europol-coordinated referral action, in which Telegram removed more than 5,000 terrorist accounts and bots over two days, Islamic State supporters shifted their distribution to fringe platforms - the Russia-based TamTam and the Canada-hosted Hoop Messenger - and experimented with chat services built for blockchain developers. Same media network, new hosting platforms.

Date not established

Islamic State propaganda migration to TamTam and Hoop Messenger. Same service on replacement infrastructure. Confidence: Medium. No later seizure recorded.[2]

After the November 2019 Europol-coordinated referral action, in which Telegram removed more than 5,000 terrorist accounts and bots over two days, Islamic State supporters shifted their distribution to fringe platforms - the Russia-based TamTam and the Canada-hosted Hoop Messenger - and experimented with chat services built for blockchain developers. Same media network, new hosting platforms.

The re-verification pass changed 10 values on this record. What was there before is kept below so the change can be checked.

Field Was Now Why it changed
Start date 2019-11-25 2019-11-21 Corrected to match the cited source. EU law enforcement and judicial authorities join forces to disrupt terrorist propaganda online
End date 2019-11-25 2019-11-24 Corrected to match the cited source. EU law enforcement and judicial authorities join forces to disrupt terrorist propaganda online
Announcement date Not recorded 2019-11-25 Corrected to match the cited source. EU law enforcement and judicial authorities join forces to disrupt terrorist propaganda online
What came down Web/media distribution infrastructure disrupted. More than 26,000 items of Islamic State-supporting content were referred to nine online service providers for terms-of-service evaluation/removal; the located official source does not establish a government seizure or takeover of infrastructure. Corrected to match the cited source. EU law enforcement and judicial authorities join forces to disrupt terrorist propaganda online
Record kind incident excluded_candidate The action was a content-referral/platform-moderation campaign and fails the dataset’s stated infrastructure-action inclusion test. EU law enforcement and judicial authorities join forces to disrupt terrorist propaganda online
Sources/src europol is web 2019.title Coordinated action against Islamic State online propaganda infrastructure EU law enforcement and judicial authorities join forces to disrupt terrorist propaganda online Recorded title is an invented paraphrase describing what the source supposedly shows; the real page headline differs. EU law enforcement and judicial authorities join forces to disrupt terrorist propaganda online
Reported apprehended count Not recorded 1 The record carries a null apprehension count, but the single official source states an arrest was made inside this operation. This also undercuts group_completeness 'not_applicable'. EU law enforcement and judicial authorities join forces to disrupt terrorist propaganda online
Name Islamic State web infrastructure takedown Islamic State online propaganda referral action (November 2019) The name asserts a web-infrastructure takedown that the source does not describe. Europol calls this a referral action against content hosted by online service providers. The actual IS web infrastructure takedown was the Belgian-led April 2018 action, which the same page describes separately. target_name 'Islamic State web/media infrastructure' has the same defect and should become something like 'Islamic State propaganda content on online service providers'. EU law enforcement and judicial authorities join forces to disrupt terrorist propaganda online
Summary A renewed EU judicial/law-enforcement operation again targeted Islamic State web infrastructure, building on the 2018 Amaq action. A referral action coordinated by Europol's EU Internet Referral Unit with Eurojust support, joined by 12 Member States and 9 online service providers, referred over 26,000 items of Islamic State propaganda for terms-of-service review; the Guardia Civil arrested one suspected core disseminator in Spain. The operation was led by the Belgian Investigating Counter Terrorism Judge and the Belgian Federal Prosecutor's Office with the Belgian Federal Judicial Police of East-Flanders, following the April 2018 Belgian-led takedown of IS web infrastructure. Two errors in one sentence: this action did not target web infrastructure, and the 2018 predecessor was not 'the Amaq action'. The page dates the Amaq actions to August 2016 and June 2017 and describes April 2018 as a separate Belgian-led operation against IS web infrastructure. EU law enforcement and judicial authorities join forces to disrupt terrorist propaganda online
Legal mechanism Coordinated national judicial/search-and-seizure authority. Europol EU Internet Referral Unit referral to online service providers for terms-of-service assessment, under Belgian judicial direction; one arrest in Spain under the Central Magistrate's Investigating Courts and the Prosecutor's Office of the Audiencia Nacional. No search or seizure is described anywhere in the source. The mechanism is voluntary provider action on referral plus one national arrest - materially weaker than the stored value, and the reason this record is rightly flagged excluded_candidate. EU law enforcement and judicial authorities join forces to disrupt terrorist propaganda online

The value that was there before is kept so the change can be checked. See these corrections in the full log.

Numbered markers throughout this entry link to the source that supports the claim beside them.

What each part of this entry rests on

The audit recorded which sources carry which part of the record. These are those sources.

Official sources

  1. [1]
    EU law enforcement and judicial authorities join forces to disrupt terrorist propaganda online

    Europol, November 25, 2019, Source grade P2

    Establishes the renewed 2019 EU-coordinated action against Islamic State web infrastructure.

    Open source

Additional reporting and technical analysis

  1. [2]
    Islamic State propaganda efforts struggle after Telegram takedowns, report says

    CyberScoop, July 28, 2020, Source grade S1

    Islamic State platform migration: after the November 2019 Europol-coordinated referral action in which Telegram removed thousands of terrorist accounts, IS supporters shifted distribution to fringe services including the Russia-based TamTam and Canada-hosted Hoop Messenger

    Open source
Coverage note. Open question on geographic_scope: Field is absent. Only Belgium and Spain are named. Europol says 12 Member States took part but does not list them, so the full scope is unverifiable and should not be guessed.