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# Amaq propaganda infrastructure takedown

April 2018, Terrorism and extremism
Led by [Belgian Federal Prosecutor's Office (Terrorism Section)](https://takedownindex.org/organizations/belgian-federal-prosecutor-s-office-terrorism-section)

Extended pass entry, last reviewed August 21, 2026

What was taken down?

Web/media distribution infrastructure disrupted.

[See what happened](#what-happened)

What happened to the people?

No individual outcomes are recorded against this entry.
Group accounted for: Not applicable

[See people and accountability](#people)

Did it stay down?

After this action the service returned on replacement infrastructure, first seen January 2019. The replacement was itself seized in a later action. Medium confidence in the link between the two.

[See what happened afterward](#afterward)

## What happened

A Belgian/EU coalition targeted the Islamic State's Amaq propaganda infrastructure, including its web and media distribution mechanisms.

**Date:** April 2018

**Target:** Amaq (Islamic State propaganda distribution infrastructure), terrorist propaganda infrastructure

**Activity:** Terrorism and extremism

**Operational lead:** Belgian Federal Prosecutor

**Partners**

Europol[[1]](#source-1)

- [European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation](https://takedownindex.org/organizations/european-union-agency-for-law-enforcement-cooperation), coordinator

**Jurisdiction:** Not established

**Outcome:** Web/media distribution infrastructure disrupted.

**Status:** Completed

**Legal mechanism:** Coordinated national judicial/search-and-seizure authority.

**Group accounted for:** Not applicable

## People and accountability

No individual is named against this entry in the cited record. That is a gap in what has been published rather than a finding that nobody was involved.

Group accounted for: Not applicable

The cited record does not say how large the group was or whether everyone involved has been identified.

[See the organizations and roles behind this action](https://takedownindex.org/takedowns/amaq-propaganda-infrastructure-takedown/organizations)

## What happened afterward

After this action the service returned on replacement infrastructure, first seen January 2019. The replacement was itself seized in a later action. Medium confidence in the link between the two.

January 2019

Renewed Islamic State propaganda infrastructure. Same service on replacement infrastructure. Confidence: Medium. Seized in a later action.[[2]](#source-2)

Islamic State rebuilt propaganda distribution infrastructure after the 2018 Amaq action, prompting the 2019 renewed operation.

[Later action: Islamic State web infrastructure takedown](https://takedownindex.org/takedowns/islamic-state-web-infrastructure-takedown)

## Sources

Numbered markers throughout this entry link to the source that supports the claim beside them.

### Official sources

1.
[Islamic State Amaq propaganda infrastructure disrupted](https://takedownindex.org/sources/europol-islamic-state-amaq-propaganda-infrastructure-disrupted)

Europol, April 27, 2018, Source grade P2

Establishes the Belgian/EU coalition action against Amaq propaganda infrastructure.

No address recorded for this source. Publisher, title, and date are given so it can be retrieved from the publisher.

2.
[Coordinated action against Islamic State online propaganda infrastructure](https://takedownindex.org/sources/europol-coordinated-action-against-islamic-state-online-propaganda-infrastructur)

Europol, November 25, 2019, Source grade P2

Establishes the renewed 2019 EU-coordinated action against Islamic State web infrastructure.

No address recorded for this source. Publisher, title, and date are given so it can be retrieved from the publisher.

Coverage note. Added from deep-research aggregation pass. Not independently re-verified source-by-source to the same standard as the original 38-incident core; source\_quality capped at S2/P2 pending a dedicated verification pass.

Research context

## How this entry was checked

This entry came from a broader aggregation pass and has not been independently verified source by source. Its sources are graded no higher than P2 or S2, and most carry no address yet. Treat the figures as a research lead rather than a settled record.

Source review: Extended pass, not yet verified

Sources cited: 2

Research cutoff: August 20, 2026

Last reviewed August 21, 2026

See also

[About the Internet Takedown Index](https://takedownindex.org/about)

Related entries

- [Islamic State web infrastructure takedown](https://takedownindex.org/takedowns/islamic-state-web-infrastructure-takedown)

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